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THE STANDARD OF PROOF OF CAUSATION 
IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 1 the United States Supreme 
Court, while holding an innocent and unsuspecting plaintiff re-
sponsible for the sins of his attorney, gave hope to similarly ag-
grieved clients: "[I]f an attorney's conduct falls substantially below 
what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's remedy is 
against the attorney in a suit for malpractice."2 Nevertheless, if 
nearly insuperable barriers prevent most aggrieved clients from 
prevailing in meritorious legal malpractice suits, the Court's reas-
surance is hollow indeed. The traditional standard of proof of 
causation in legal malpractice cases, the "but for" test, 3 stands as 
one imposing barrier to recovery. To the extent that judges invoke 
misplaced confidence in the malpractice remedy to justify punish-
ing clients for attorney misconduct, they distort the legal process. 4 
This Note examines the standard of proof of causation applied 
1 370 U.S. 626 (1962). The Court upheld a dismissal with prejudice entered after the 
plaintiff's attorney failed to appear at a pretrial conference. The suit was already six years 
old when it was dismissed. The Court inferred from the record that the plaintiff's attorney 
had caused much of the delay. Id. at 634-35 n.11. A vehement dissent questioned the 
majority's censure of the attorney. Id. at 637-43 (dissenting opinion, Black,].). 
2 Id. at 634 n.lO. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan characterized the attorney as 
the agent of the client: 
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he 
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected 
agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of represen-
tative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent .... 
Id. at 633-34. The majority and the dissent disagreed strongly over the egregiousness of 
the attorney's behavior. See note I supra. Absolutely clear, however, was the short-term 
consequence to the client-dismissal with prejudice due to events unknown to the client 
and only theoretically under his control. See D. RosENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN 
CHARGE? 121-23 (1974). 
3 See notes 11-38 and accompanying text infra. 
4 Federal courts of appeals have relied on Link in upholding harsh invocations of pro-
cedural rules. See, e.g., Universal Film Exchs. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(summary judgment following attorney's failure to enter appearance); Schwarz v. United 
States, 384 F.2d 833, 835-36 (2d Cir. I 967) (dismissal for failure to prosecute following 
gross neglect by plaintiff's counsel). For an example of stringent application of procedural 
rules in order to promote legal malpractice suits, see Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198 
(D. Md. 1976), discussed in notes 34-37 and accompanying text infra. 
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in legal malpractice cases that arise from the negligence of 
litigators. 5 The Note sets forth the traditional "but for" test of 
causation, its harshness in the context of legal malpractice actions, 6 
and recent attempts to mitigate that harshness. Some courts have 
eased the aggrieved client's task by shifting burdens of proof under 
the "but for" test. 7 One court has forged a far-reaching new test 
which permits an inference of causation from a client's "lost oppor-
tunity" of success in the underlying action. 8 Another court has 
separated the issue of attorney's negligence from that of client's 
loss by requiring bifurcation of the malpractice trial. 9 This Note 
proposes a new standard, drawn from medical misdiagnosis cases, 
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a "lost substantial possibil-
ity of recovery." 10 
I 
TRADITIONAL ToRT THEORY AND THE "BuT FoR" TEST 
Courts have not consistently treated legal malpractice as 
sounding in tort rather than contract.U Even where courts speak in 
terms of contract, however, the elements of the cause of action are 
indistinguishable from those of the traditional tort claim. 12 Typi-
cally, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to 
meet a certain standard of care in his conduct toward the plaintiff; 
(2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach caused ari injury 
5 The standard of care required of attorneys, although not totally separable from the 
issue of causation, is not this Note's primary concern. It has, however, developed its own 
substantial literature. See, e.g., Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1961); 
Schnidman & Selzer, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: W£ll New Standards of Care Place Profes-
sional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 541 (1976); 
Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408, 408-21 (1977). 
6 See notes 11-38 and accompanying text infra. 
7 See notes 39-57 and accompanying text infra. 
8 See notes 58-64 and accompanying text infra. 
9 See notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra. 
10 See notes 70-81 and accompanying text infra. 
11 Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 756-57 (1959); 
Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1292-93 (1963). 
12 Wade, supra note 11, at 756; Note, supra note 11, at 1293. See, e.g., Coon v. Ginsberg, 
32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973); Boecher v. Borth, 51 App. Div. 2d 598, 599-
600, 377 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784-85 (3d Dep't 1976) (dissenting opinion, Larkin, J.); Young v. 
Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968). 
Tort and contract actions may, however, have different statutes of limitations. Rem-
edies also may vary, since noneconomic losses are more easily recoverable in a negligence 
action. 
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to the plaintiff; and ( 4) the injury was realY The traditional test for 
the third element, causation, is the "but for" test. This test merely 
restates the requirement of causation in fact- that harm would not 
have occurred "but for" the defendant's negligence.14 The burden 
of proof is usually on the plaintiff to prove causation in fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 15 
In legal malpractice cases, however, courts often combine the 
"but for" requirement with a high standard of proof. As a result, in 
many jurisdictions the simple "but for" test has come to stand for 
an impossibly demanding burden of proof, which has a devastating 
effect on the prosecution of meritorious malpractice actions. For 
instance, in Coon v. Ginsberg, 16 a Colorado appellate court required 
a "showing with certainty"17 that the plaintiff had sustained actual 
13 See Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 205, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973); W. PRoSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 30 (4th ed. 1971). 
Judges often fail to distinguish among the elements of the claim. For example, judges 
often collapse the standard of care and the causation elements into a single indeterminate 
category. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, liS Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), 
discussed in notes 58-64 and accompanying text infra. See aLw Note, Erosion of the Traditional 
Suit Within a Suit Requirement, 7 U. ToL. L. REV. 328 (1975). 
Judges, however, do usually isolate the element of injury. Unless the plaintiff alleges 
and proves injury, the court has no reason to inquire into other elements. See, e.g., Brosie 
v. Stockton, 105 Ariz. 574, 468 P.2d 933 (1970); St. John v. Tepper, 54 App. Div. 2d 712, 
387 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.); Creative Inception, Inc. v. Andrews, 50 App. 
Div. 2d 553, 377 N.Y.S.2d I (lst Dep't 1975) (mem.); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Patterson & Lamberty, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). Often narrow definitions 
of "injury" have protected negligent attorneys. For example, if a client could not have 
collected the original judgment. because of the defendant's insolvency, a court might decide 
that no "injury" resulted from the attorney's negligence. See Jackson v. Urban, Coolidge, 
Pennington & Scott, 516 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). The Virginia Supreme 
Court has extended the principle to an absurdity: As long as the client (defendant in the 
original action) has not paid an outstanding judgment, he has suffered no injury. Allied 
Prods., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 766,232 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1977). "If the client has 
no cause of action until he has paid the judgment against him, then the larger the judg-
ment, the greater the client's burden and the lawyer's impunity; the greater the injury 
wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability of the wrongdoer." Id. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at 777 
(dissenting opinion, Poff, ].). 
Traditionally, the defendant's good faith is no defense to a negligence action. In legal 
malpractice, however, some courts do recognize a good faith defense. See State v. Baker, 
539 S.W.2d 367, 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum); Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal 
Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689,697-700 (1977). 
14 W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 41, at 238-39. The "but. for" test serves merely to 
exclude conduct that has not caused plaintiff's harm. Even if the test establishes causation 
in fact, defendant's liability does not necessarily follow. I d. at 239. There remains a question 
of law-whether the law will limit defendant's liability for the consequences caused in fact 
by his conduct. See id. at 239-41; id. § 42. 
15 Id. § 41, at 241-44. 
16 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973). 
17 Id. at 210, 509 P.2d at 1295. 
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damages as the result of the defendant attorney's negligence. 18 
Courts usually apply the "but for" test mechanically, without 
reasoned analysis. 19 Thus it is difficult to ascertain how demand-
ing a standard of proof they in fact require. Few courts would 
impose a certainty requirement as explicitly as did the Coon court. 
Nevertheless, the facts in some cases suggest that, in effect, the 
courts may be requiring a standard of virtual certainty. 20 In 
Weiner v. Moreno, 21 for example, a Florida appellate court re-
manded a case for redetermination of an attorney's liability,22 
even though the plaintiff had conclusively demonstrated that the 
attorney had been negligent23 and that, in the underlying medical 
malpractice case, two surgical packs had been left in the patient's 
18 The court did not clearly label its certainty requirement as either a causation stan-
dard or a standard of proof. In either role, however, the requirement serves to insulate 
negligent attorneys from liability. A passage from an often-cited annotation demonstrates 
the common combination of standards of causation and burden of proof: 
In the great majority of the cases which have passed upon the questions it has 
been held that a client claiming that his attorney was negligent in connection with 
litigation has the burden of proving that damages resulted, this burden involving, 
usually, the difficult task of demonstrating that, but for the negligence complained 
of, the client would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the 
action in question. 
Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 21 (1956). 
Jury instructions for a cettainty requirement could take two different forms, theoreti-
cally distinct but effectively equivalent: 
l) You must be convinced to a certainty that but for defendant's negligence, 
plaintiff would probably have won the first suit. 
2) You must find it more probable than not that plaintiff would certainly have 
won the first suit but for defendant's negligence. 
19 See, e.g., Pusey v. Reed, 258 A.2d 460, 461 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969); Freeman v. Rubin, 
318 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 
179 N .W.2d 288, 290-91 (1970); Jackson v. Urban, Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 
S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Gibson v. Johnson, 414 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968). 
20 See, e.g., Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D.W. Va. 1961) 
(plaintiff must show that "result could only have been in its favor"). See also Gladden v. Lo-
gan, 28 App. Div. 2d 1116, 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d 920,921 (1967) ("Whether this [standard] is 
called 'that she would recover' or that 'she probably would recover' is merely a matter of 
phrasing."); Annot., supra note 18, at 21. The Gladden court rejected plaintiff's request that 
"probably" be added to the jury instruction on causation. 
Whatever the standard of proof imposed, it is clear that the "but for" test of causa-
tion creates difficulties for malpractice plaintiffs. Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27 ARK. L. 
REV. 452, 466-68 (1973). See Note, supra note 11, at 1307-08; Note, supra note 13, 52 IND. 
L.J. at 693-94. "Courts ... are given the 'easy out' of finding that while, yes, the attorney 
was I~egligent, his negligence did not 'proximately cause' the client's damages since the 
client might well have lost the first suit anyway." D. RosENTHAL, supra note 2, at 126. 
21 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
22 Id. at 220. 
23 ld.at219. 
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body.24 Weiner is particularly disturbing because it purports to fol-
low Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 25 a case that enunciates a simple 
"but for" test. 26 Since a majority of jurisdictions look to Maryland 
Casualty for the standard of causation in legal malpractice,27 cases 
that read its rule to require virtual certainty may influence other 
jurisdictions also to attach a demanding standard of proof to the 
"but for" test. 
A standard of proof that requires a plaintiff to prove to a 
virtual certainty that, but for the defendant's negligence, the 
plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action, in effect 
immunizes most negligent attorneys from liability. No matter how 
outrageous and morally reprehensible the attorney's behavior may 
have been, if minimal doubt exists as to the outcome in the origi-
nal action, the plaintiff may not recover in the malpractice action. 
Except in those rare instances where the initial action was a "sure 
thing," the certainty requirement protects attorneys from liability 
for their negligence. 
A strict "but for" test also ignores settlement opportunities 
lost due to the attorney's negligence. The test focuses on whether 
the client would have won in the original action. A high standard 
of proof of causation encourages courts' tendencies to exclude 
evidence about settlement as too remote and speculative. 28 The 
standard therefore excludes consideration of the most common 
form of client recovery. 
In addition, stringent standards of proving "but for" require 
the plaintiff to conduct a "trial within a trial" to show the validity 
of his underlying claim. 29 A full, theoretically complete recon-
24 ld. at 218. 
25 231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916). 
26 See id. at 402. 
27 Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d at 219. The Weiner court estimated in 1973 that 45 
states had adopted the Maryland Casualty rule. ld. 
28 See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 296, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974). 
A procedure for recovering lost settlement opportunities is described in the text ac· 
companying notes 65-69 infra. Evidence on settlement would require speculation as to the 
amount of settlement, a factor only partly dependent on the merits of the action. 
29 See Coggin, Attorney Negligence ... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225 
( 1958); Wade, supra note 11, at 769· 71; Note, supra note 13, 52 INn. L..J. at 69 l-95. See also 
Note, supra note 13, 7 U. ToL. L. REv. at 330. One lawyer even prosecuted a "suit within a 
suit within a suit" when the first legal malpractice action was itself badly handled. Roth-
stein, Lawyers' Malpractice in Litigation, 2 I CLEV. ST. L. REv., May I 972, at I, 13-14. 
One pattern jury instruction on causation in malpractice requires the "trial within a 
trial": 
Even though you find that defendant was negligent in failing to bring an 
action ... on plaintiff's behalf, plaintiff may not recover in this action unless you 
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struction of the original trial would require evidence about such 
matters as the size of jury verdicts in the original jurisdiction. For 
example, an experienced attorney could testify that juries in that 
jurisdiction typically award verdicts of x dollars in similar cases. 
But such evidence is too remote and speculative; 30 the new fact-
finder must try the merits of both the malpractice suit and the un-
derlying claim to make an independent determination of the dam-
age award. The cost and complexity of such a proceeding may well 
discourage the few plaintiffs otherwise willing to pursue the slim 
chance of success. 31 
Other problems await those who do proceed with the "trial 
within a trial." For example, the attorney in the original action 
may have negligently failed to pursue the discovery that would 
have insured success. If the results of that same discovery are now 
necessary to prove the merit of the underlying claim-and the 
passage of time has precluded obtaining that information-the at-
torney by his own negligence will have protected himself from 
liability. In such a case, the more negligent the attorney, the more 
difficult is the plaintiff's task of proving causation. 32 
To some extent, a legal malpractice suit must consist of this 
"trial within a trial." The very requirement of causation dictates 
that the merits of the malpractice action depend upon the merits 
of the original claim. If, however, a less stringent standard of 
proof were imposed, such a full-scale reenactment would be un-
necessary. 33 
Nonetheless many judges remain insensitive to the harsh ef-
fects of a stringent "but for" test. For instance, in Brown v. E. W. 
Bliss Co. ,34 the court extended Link's reliance on the malpractice 
further find that he would have been successful in an action . . . had one been 
brought. In order to decide the latter question, you must, in effect, decide a law-
suit within a lawsuit, for unless you decide that on the evidence presented in this 
case plaintiff would have been successful in an action ... had one been brought, 
your verdict must be for defendant. In such an action [insert ruks that would govern 
burden of proof and substantive law in the action ... ]. 
1 NEW YoRK PATTERN jURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 404 (2d eel. 1974) (italics in original). 
30 See Coggin, su.pra note 29, at 234. 
31 Data on potential but uninitiated legal malpractice suits would provide strong evi-
dence of the deterrent effect of present requirements. Such data, however, do not exist. In 
fact, data about all legal malpractice problems are sparse. See generally Note, Improving In-
formation on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590 (1973). 
32 For a discussion of one court's attempt to deal with this procedural complexity, see 
notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra. 
33 See text accompanying notes 76-77 infra. 
34 72 F.R.D. I 98 (D. Mel. 1976). 
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suit as a remedy for aggrieved clients35 by concluding that judges 
should strictly enforce procedural rules to promote prosecution of 
malpractice claims: 
The time has come for lawyers to be responsible for their 
mistakes and their lack of attention to their professional respon-
sibilities .... Yet few are the attorney malpractice suits which are 
brought. And few will be brought if trial judges look the other 
way in the face of clear incompetence and regularly give attor-
neys another chance where they have disregarded schedules 
reasonably set for the disposition of litigation .... 3G 
The court naively viewed the legal malpractice suit as a routine 
matter and overlooked barriers to recovery: 
All that plaintiffs need do for a full recovery is to sue their 
attorney, prove that they had a proper claim and are entitled to 
damages, and further allege and show that their failure to re-
cover on their claim was due to the negligence of their attor-
ney.37 
This view ignores the obstacles imposed by the "but for" test, as 
well as the inconvenience to a plaintiff who must face delays in 
initiating and prosecuting a second suit after losing the initial 
claim. 
Because of its harshness the "but for" test has not served the 
judicial system well in legal malpractice cases. Although the test 
remains the majority test for causation in legal malpractice ac-
tions,38 a few courts have breached its imposing walls. 
II 
RECENT ATTEMPTS TO MoDIFY THE CAUSATION STANDARD 
Reacting to the harshness of the "but for" test, some courts 
have adopted one of three techniques to facilitate prosecution of 
legal malpractice actions: (1) retaining the language of the "but for" 
test while creating presumptions and shifting the burden of proof 
to mitigate its harsh effects; (2) adopting an entirely new standard 
of proof of causation; or (3) bifurcating the malpractice trial. 
35 See notes l-4 and accompanying text supra. 
36 72 F.R.D. at 200. 
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
38 See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
1978) LEGAL MALPRACTICE 673 
A. Presumptions and Burden Shifting 
Two recent cases, Baker v. Beaf39 and Winter v. Brown,40 illus-
trate the first technique for lightening the plaintiff's load. In Baker, 
the Iowa Supreme Court used the language of presumption to 
make more difficult the attorneys' attempt to show the invalidity of 
their client's original claimY Defendant attorneys had brought a 
statutory dramshop action, but failed to allege one of the statutory 
elements, proof that a licensee or permittee operated the tavern 
involved. 42 In the subsequent legal malpractice action, the former 
client failed to prove precisely the same element. 43 This, the de-
fendant attorneys argued, required dismissal of the action, since 
the plaintiff had not proved that the failure to allege the statutory 
element was the cause of her defeat in the original action. 44 The 
Iowa court, however, held that the attorneys' decision to bring the 
original action under a particular statute was enough, on these 
facts, to create a presumption of the missing element's existence: 
We will not assume after they had the case in their office for two 
years they selected a statutory cause of action upon which no 
relief could be granted. We hold plaintiff is entitled to the same 
presumption defendants rely on in another context: everyone is 
presumed to have discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, 
until the contrary is made to appear. 45 
Because Baker involved a statutory action and a two-year delay 
before the action was filed, the argument for attorney liability was 
unusually strong.46 The premise underlying Baker, however, is one 
that other courts can extend to more difficult fact situations: If an 
attorney brings an action on behalf of his client and makes no 
effort to dissuade the client of the likelihood of success, the attor-
39 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975). 
40 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976). 
41 225 N.W.2d at 110. 
42 I d. at 108. 
43 I d. at 109. 
44 Id. at 110. 
45 Id. 
46 The plaintiff's failure to prove one element of the underlying claims was not merely 
a technical error that the court was willing to overlook. The identity of a licensee or permit-
tee of the tavern was legitimately in issue. The court suggested that, in the absence of a 
licensee or permittee, the attorneys should have brought a different statutory action. By 
their particular choice, however, the attorneys subjected themselves to the presumption of 
that claim's validity. Id. at 110. To rebut the presumption, the attorneys would presumably 
have had to show the absence of any valid cause of action. 
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ney shall not then be heard to say that the suit was meritless. 47 
Indeed, the attorney's assurances that the suit is proceeding satis-
factorily and even his failure to suggest that the client go elsewhere 
might be sufficient to create a presumption of the claim's merit. 
In Winter, the court employed a similar procedural device-
shifting the burden of proof-to facilitate plaintiffs' proof of causa-
tion. In the underlying medical malpractice action, defendant at-
torneys had missed a statutory deadline, rendering the plaintiffs' 
claims against the county and its hospital unenforceable. 48 When 
the clients sued the attorneys for loss of these claims, the attorneys 
argued that plaintiffs could still sue the treating resident physician 
and so had not yet suffered injury.49 At least, the attorneys ar-
gued, plaintiffs' damages (the value of the lost claims) should be 
reduced by the amount plaintiffs could recover from the intern. 
Since a jury could not calculate the difference in the values of the 
claims, the defendant attorneys argued that there should be no re-
covery.50 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals strongly disagreed: 
Appellants [defendant attorneys] have precipitated a situa-
tion in which the difference in value between the cause of action 
of which they deprived appellees and the cause of action which 
appellees still retain against hospital agents or employees is not 
subject to fair measurement or calculation. It is tbey, rather than 
appellees, who must bear the onus of their error and the resul-
tant impossibility of ascertaining the value of what was lost. 5 1 
Relying on this rationale, the court permitted an inference of cau-
sation of the total injury from the finding that defendants caused 
some harm. Thus, in effect, the court shifted to the negligent attor-
neys the burden of proving the extent of the loss not attributable to 
their own negligence. 
Winter suggests a new allocation of the burden of proving cau-
sation in malpractice actions arising from previous litigation. The 
47 Cf. Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 
(1973) (defendant attorneys estopped from denying facts in untimely but otherwise 
meritorious demand for arbitration). See also Note, supra note 13, 52 IND. L.J. at 703. "The 
Baker court thus appears to support the creation of a presumption in a litigation malprac-
tice action that the underlying action was valid on a bare showing of the existence of the 
attorney-client relationship." Id. 
48 365 A.2d at 382-83. 
49 Id. at 383. 
5o !d. 
51 I d. at 385 (footnote omitted). 
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approach, however, derives from an established line of cases, dat-
ing from Summers v. Tice, 52 that puts the burden on negligent de-
fendants to prove difficult allocations of causation among them-
selves. 
With Winter as precedent, courts in malpractice cases might 
look to analogous medical malpractice cases to resolve allocation of 
liability among multiple causes. In Fosgate v. Corona, 53 a medical 
malpractice action, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the 
Summers rationale to a case in which the defendant was the sole 
wrongdoer but there was another cause of the plaintiff's injury. 
While the Fosgate plaintiff clearly showed misdiagnosis by the de-
fendant physician,54 this malpractice only aggravated a preexist-
ing disease. The trial judge had instructed that the plaintiff could 
recover only to the extent that she could isolate the harm attribut-
able to such aggravation. 55 The supreme court disagreed. Once the 
plaintiff showed that the defendant's negligence was one of two 
contributing causes of harm, the court shifted the burden to the de-
fendant to show that all harm was not due to his misdiagnosis. The 
court realized that its decision might create an impossible burden 
for malpractice defendants. It nevertheless held that 
the innocent plaintiff should not be required to establish what 
expenses, pain, suffering, disability or impairment are attribut-
able solely to the malpractice or tortious act, but ... the burden 
of proof should be shifted to the culpable defendant who should 
be held responsible for all damages unless he can demonstrate 
that the damages for which he is responsible are capable of some 
reasonable apportionment and what those damages are. 56 
The allocations of burdens in Winter and Fosgate related to 
slightly different elements of the malpractice tort. Winter dealt with 
the extent of harm caused when it was clear that the defendant 
caused some harm. Fosgate involved harm that might have occurred 
despite the physician's negligence. The underlying principle is, 
however, the same in each case: When the defendant's negligence 
hinders proof of one element of the cause of action, the burden of 
proof on that issue shifts to him. The legal malpractice analogue of 
the preexisting natural disease in Fosgate is the imperfection in the 
52 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
53 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974). 
54 Id. at 274, 330 A.2d at 358-59. 
55 I d. at 272, 330 A.2d at 357. 
56 I d. at 272-73, 330 A.2d at 358. 
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plaintiff's underlying claim. Shifting the burden of proof while 
maintaining a high standard of proof would impose a difficult re-
quirement on the attorney, even though he need prove only that 
one element of the plaintiff's claim was missing. But it is easier for 
the attorney to prove the absence of one element in the underlying 
claim than for the plaintiff to prove the presence of all elements. 
Thus, such a shifting of burdens to the negligent attorney is 
reasonable. 
Presumptions and burden shifting enable judges to achieve 
just results by tinkering with the "but for" test in select cases. Since, 
however, the heart of the problem lies with that test's stringent 
standard of proof, a better starting point is the standard itself.5 7 A 
new standard would render judicial analysis more elegant and 
more predictable. 
B. An Alternative Standard of Causation 
Despite the pressing need for reform, courts have been slow to 
revise the "but for" test and to reject the standard of certainty. 
Moreover, the most significant recent attempt at reform has left 
the law in California awkward and unpredictable. In Smith v. 
Lewis,58 the California Supreme Court affirmed a decision impos-
ing liability on an attorney who, after skimpy legal research in a 
divorce action, had failed to assert his client's community interest in 
her husband's retirement benefits. The retirement benefits had two 
components: state benefits, "unquestionably community property 
according to all available authority ,"59 and federal benefits, only 
arguably community property.60 In imposing liability on the attor-
ney, the court set high standards of care for legal research. 61 In 
addition, the court, without clearly phrasing any new test, consid-
erably lowered the causation standard. The court refused to upset 
the jury's inference of causation despite the absence of traditional 
proof of causation. 62 
57 Presumptions and burden shifting have their adherents among legal malpractice 
commentators. E.g., Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 4S NoTRE DAME 
LAW. SSS, S93 (1973); Note, supra note 13, 52 IND. L.J. at 701-04 ("modified res ipsa lo-
quitur"). 
58 13 Cal. 3d 349,530 P.2d 5S9, 11S Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). 
59 !d. at 35S, 530 P.2d at 594, 1 1S Cal. Rptr. at 626. 
60 !d. 
61 An attorney, according to the court, should r~ject a position learnedly, only after 
research. The attorney must "exercis[e] informed discretion with regard to his client's 
rights." ld., 530 P.2d at 595, liS Cal. Rptr. at 627. 
62 /d. at 361 n.9, 530 P.2d at 596-97 n.9, liS Cal. Rptr. at 62S-29 n.9. 
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Because the Smith causation test imposed liability for the attor-
ney's failure to assert a merely arguable claim, it may be character-
ized as a test of "lost opportunity." The "injury" remains the 
amount of the underlying claim. From a showing of "lost opportu-
nity" to prevail on that claim, the jury may infer that the defendant 
in fact caused the injury.63 Almost all litigation presents "opportu-
nities" that the competent attorney will routinely bypass without 
research, concentrating instead on the primary claims. Under the 
Smith standard, the lawyer does so at his peril. Once the plaintiff 
shows the loss of a minimal opportunity, he has created a causation 
issue for the jury. Of course, the defendant may still introduce 
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's claim. But the first critical step for 
a plaintiff in a negligence trial is getting the issue to the jury. 64 
Smith makes that step a short, easy one. 
Although it reached an extreme result, Smith at least attempted 
to modify the troublesome causation standard. The "lost opportu-
nity" test creates the potential for unjust decisions against attor-
neys, but the fault lies with the choice of standard and not the de-
cision to forge a new rule. 
C. The Bifurcated Trial 
In Fuschetti v. Bierman,65 the New Jersey Superior Court pro-
posed a third approach aimed at the procedural horrors of the trial 
within a trial: bifurcating the trial of the legal malpractice claim. 
Under the Fuschetti procedure,66 the first trial determines whether 
the attorney breached his duty of care to his client. If the jury finds 
a breach of duty, a second trial determines the client's loss by 
ascertaining the validity of the underlying claim. If the attorney's 
63 Although the court found a breach of the standard of care, the case does not strictly 
stand for the proposition that the jury could infer causation from such a breach alone. 
Contra, Note, supra note 13, 52 IND. L..J. at 704 ("That the attorney caused the malpractice 
plaintiff's harm is presumed from a jury determination of negligence."). Both claims were 
at least arguably valid; the plaintiff did indeed lose an opportunity. 
In fact, juries probably often do their own discounting based on the probability of 
success of the original claim and despite the lack of instruction from the court on the 
point. The Smith jury seems to have done such discounting. Testimony indicated that the 
present value of the state benefits was $272,954; the federal, $49,078. A one-half share 
would have been $161,016, but the jury awarded only $100,000. 13 Cal. 3d at 361, 530 
P.2d at 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
64 Jury concern for the wronged plaintiff may overwhelm its consideration of causa-
tion, particularly if the defendant attorney's negligence was egregious. 
65 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781 (1974). 
66 The court ordered bifurcation and provided instructions for the proceeding. Id. at 
297-98, 319 A.2d at 785. 
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negligence led to the loss of evidence crucial to the client's claim in 
the underlying action, the jury in the second trial should under-
stand the reason for the evidentiary deficiency. To ensure this, the 
same jury sits for both trials, with at most one day between ses-
sions.67 
The Fuschetti procedure takes one step toward keeping sepa-
rate the various elements of the malpractice claim. In addition, it 
lets the plaintiff regain settlement opportunities lost in the initial 
action. If in the first trial the· attorney is found negligent, then in 
the second trial the plaintiff faces the attorney as he would have 
faced the original defendant. The possibility of settlement thus 
depends on the merits of the initial claim. 
Unfortunately, the bifurcated procedure obscures the causa-
tion issue. Only the carry-over jury provides any consideration of 
the causal relationship between the attorney's negligence and the 
client's loss on the original claim. Because the Fuschetti procedure 
does not require the trial judge to instruct the jury on causation, 
only the jury's common sense would lead it to consider the causa-
tion issue. An attorney's negligence may have no connection with 
subsequent loss of a meritorious claim,68 so Fuschetti's assumption 
that causation exists is not justified. In addition, although bifurca-
tion helps to keep some analytic distinctions clear, it does so by 
blurring the interlocking nature of the elements of the malpractice 
claim. Without knowing the nature of the underlying claim, for 
example, the factfinder cannot determine whether a breach of 
duty has occurred. 69 Thus, Fuschetti adds procedural complexity 
while creating as many problems as it solves. 
None of the alternative approaches found in recent cases 
adequately remedies the defects of a strict "but for" test, and some 
provide their own new, potentially burdensome defects. Yet within 
an existing body of tort law, medical misdiagnosis cases, lies an 
acceptable new standard of causation for legal malpractice actions. 
67 Id. 
68 A perhaps absurd but telling example is that of an attorney who does absolutely 
nothing for a client with a meritorious cause of action. If the cause of action fails because 
the client independently decides not to prosecute, then the attorney's negligence does not 
cause the client's loss. 
69 A related problem that has yet to reach its full litigation potential is the quality of 
work attorneys should be expected to perform on small claims. If attorneys must exhaus-
tively research every case, they will tend not to accept small claims, no matter how 
meritorious. 
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In medical misdiagnosis cases, close analogues to litigator 
malpractice cases, most courts have abandoned stringent standards 
of proving "but for" causation. In the archetypal case, deterioration 
of an already ill or injured patient follows the misdiagnosis. In 
suing the physician, the patient must show that his deterioration 
would not have occurred without the physician's mistake. The 
Fourth Circuit, in Hicks v. United States ,7° adopted a "lost substan-
tial possibility of survival" as the standard of causation in such 
cases: 
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effec-
tively terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in 
the defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of 
the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. 
If there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defen-
dant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to 
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened 
in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to 
pass. The law does not in the existing circumstances require the 
plaintiff to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived 
had she been hospitalized and operated on promptly. 71 
Many jurisdictions have explicitly adopted the Hicks test for medical 
malpractice, 72 and others have adopted similar standards without 
mentioning Hicks. 73 
The Hicks rule meets the need for a new legal malpractice 
causation standard. Applying the standard to legal malpractice 
merely requires substituting "recovery" for "survival." 74 Upon a 
70 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). 
71 Id. at 632. 
72 See, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970) (Hicks persuasive in 
determining Arkansas law); Schuler v. Berger, 275 F. Supp. 120, 123-24 (E.D. Pa. 1967) 
(Hicks cited as substantive law of Pennsylvania), aff'd, 395 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1968); Whit-
field v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 184, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568-69 (1969) (Hick> 
substantive law of Virginia). 
73 See, e.g., Merriman v. Toothaker, 9 Wash. App. 810, 815, 515 P.2d 509, 512 (1973) 
("probable or more likely than not"). 
74 As formulated, the test is directed to plaintiffs who were also plaintiffs in the origi-
nal action. For such plaintiffs, the word "recovery" emphasizes that the court may consider 
lost settlement as well as lost judgment opportunities. See note 28 and accompanying text 
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showing of a "lost substantial possibility of recovery," the factfinder 
may infer causation. 75 The requirement that the possibility be 
"substantial" eliminates the Smith problem-subjecting attorneys to 
catastrophic liability for failing to prosecute minimally viable 
claims. Although the plaintiff must still provide evidence of the 
merits of the underlying claim, the requirement of showing cer-
tainty, often precluded by the attorney's prior behavior,76 no 
longer exists. 77 The client must show a substantial, but not flawless 
claim. Hence, the Hicks rule requires less than a full-blown "trial 
within a trial." 
To be sure, courts have sometimes advocated different treat-
ment of medical and legal malpractice cases. For example, the 
Oregon Supreme Court in Hansen v. Bussman 78 stressed the special 
nature of personal injuries and the need for greater judicial so-
licitude for them. 79 Strong policy reasons, however, justify bridg-
ing the medical-legal gap. Both bar associations and judges have 
proclaimed the special place of the legal profession in American 
society and the importance of high standards of care for attor-
neys. 80 But high standards of care do not safeguard that special 
place if a high standard of proof of causation makes malpractice 
recovery virtually impossible. Moreover, because of its control of 
the judiciary and dominance of the legislatures, the legal profes-
sion is self-protected. To the population in general and to the 
supra. For aggrieved clients who were defendants in the underlying action, the test may be 
modified to "lost substantial possibility of success." 
75 Cf. Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 206, 224 So. 2d 236, 239 (1969). ("There 
must be some evidence to the effect tbat such negligence probably caused the injury .... 
But this does not eliminate Alabama's 'scintilla' rule. If there is a scintilla of evidence that 
the negligence complained of probably caused the injury, a jury question is presented."). 
76 See notes 32, 67, and accompanying text sujJra. 
77 The presumption and burden-shifting cases recognize that defendants who make 
proof difficult should not be protected by high standards of proof. See notes 39-57 and 
accompanying text supra. 
A sample jury instruction for the proposed standard is: 
If you find that the defendant's actions resulted in the plaintiff's losing a sub-
stantial possibility of recovery, either through settlement or judgment, you may 
infer that the defendant's action caused the plaintiff's injury. 
78 274 Or. 757, 549 P.2d 1265 (1976). 
79 I d. at 784-85, 549 P .2d at 1280-81. 
80 
"The time has come for lawyers to be responsible for their mistakes and their lack of 
attention to their professional responsibilities." Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198, 200 
(D. Md. 1976). "Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of 
society .... A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of 
ethical conduct." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE. 
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medical profession in particular, the legal profession appears to 
advocate a double standard. 81 
CoNCLUSION 
The assumption of Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 82 that attorneys 
may be held ultimately responsible for their negligence, remains 
unwarranted. A restrictive "but for" standard of causation has 
rendered the "client's remedy" no remedy at all. For Link's logical 
structure to stand, courts must make malpractice recovery a realis-
tic possibility. Judicial attempts to change "but for" have so far 
been misdirected. Use of presumptions and burden shifting fails to 
face squarely the need for a new standard. The California Su-
preme Court's sub silentio adoption of a new standard in Srnith v. 
Lewis83 overreacts to the harshness of the traditional rule. Bifurcat-
ing the malpractice trial merely substitutes one set of complications 
for another. 
A workable, new standard, "lost substantial possibility of re-
covery," already exists in medical misdiagnosis cases. This standard 
would not threaten attorneys with unjustifiable, catastrophic liabil-
ity. Such a standard would put liability where it is due and at the 
same time harmonize the law in two areas of professional malprac-
tice. 
Erik M. Jensen 
81 See Haughey, S1tpra note 57, at 889, 904-06. 
82 370 U.S. 626 (1962). See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra. 
83 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). See notes 58-64 and ac-
companying text supra. 
